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The respondents seek the affirmance of the 
Court's order granting said respondents' motion 
for Arrest of Judgment. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The respondents concur in the allegations of 
the State, concerning the disposition in the lower 
court wherein respondents Chavez Whitehorse, Reid 
Barber, Mose Clark, Clarence Peter, and Harry 
Tsosie were convicted of the crime of assault with 
intent to commit rape, and respondent Harrison 
Largo was convicted of simple assault. Respondents 
further agree that after the return of the afore-
rnent i oned verdicts by the jury, the Court granted 
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respondents' motion for Arrest of Judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondents agree with the Statement of Facts 
as I isted in the brief of the appellant , insofar 
as they go. However, it is the contention of 
respondents that in addition to the facts as 
stated in said brief of appellant certain other 
factual information is required to place in proper 
perspective the occurrences. 
The facts indicate that on April 7, 1969 
there was a power failure at the lntermountain 
Indian School located at Brigham City, Utah. This 
power failure resulted in the campus being plunged 
into darkness and cons i derab I e amount of vanda I is:. 
occurred, as wel 1 as the attack on a number of 
female students, including the rape of two of said 
students (T.231-233). 
The Indian School then conducted its own 
investigation for some time, and indicated to 
certain tribal leaders that they intended to call 
in the Brigham City Pol ice Department for assist-
ance, as indicated in the testimony of one of the 
supervisors of the Indian School: 
I met with them and informed them 
of our procedure that we were fol lowing, 
how we were involving Mr. Sneddon 
(Brigham City police officer), and the 
sessions, the question sessions with the 
students and how we were going to proceed." 
On Apri I 8, 9, JO, 11, and 12, the investiga· 
tion and questioning took place (T. 194). 
The questioning of these students was con-
ducted both by Indian School staff as well as by 
Officer Sneddon. The time period during which the 
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students were questioned ra11ged from after noon 
until as late as 5:00 A.M. (T.217). In one 
instance a defendant, Reid Barber, was brought 
from his bed at 11:00 P.M. on the ninth day of 
April, 1969, was not questioned but returned to 
his bed after a wait of approximately one hour. 
He was then returned to the off ice where 
Mr. Sneddon was conducting the questioning on the 
tenth day of April, 1969, and remained there for 
approximately one hour and was again returned to 
his dormitory. The third time he was brought for 
questioning was at approximately 1:00 A.M. and he 
remained approximately one hour before being ques-
tioned (T.326). 
The transcript is replete with instances 
wherein the school authorities indicated they took 
an active part in the interrogation of specific 
students (T.185, T.328, T.215, T.314, T.316, T.319, 
T.323, T.328, T.338, T.444). 
In several instances the school authorities 
indicated during the testimony that they considered 
their position to be one in which they had investi-
gative responsibilities and duties. This included 
statements (T.375) that the employees considered 
they were representing 11 both sides. 11 In addition 
(T.444), there is testimony that a Mr. Smith inter-
rogated Harry Tsosie as follows: 
was there when I was about -- and 
then he took me out, and this was 
about 2:30 A.M. 
11Q. Two-thirty in the morning? 
11A. Yes. 
11Q. And who had you ta 1 ked to between 
10:00 o 1clock and 2:30 in the morning? 
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Just Mr. Smith. 
11Q. And what question did Mr. Smith 
ask you? 
He told me that I was involved with 
the breaking into the girls' building 
and he told me to tel I what I was 
doing over there. He had a tape 
recorder that I talked into. 
11Q. And did he have a tape recorder al 1 
the time? 
Yes. He turned it off when he went 
out. 11 
We concur with the statement of appellant 
at no time did the employees of the lntermountain 
Indian School advise the defendants of their rights 
under the rule embodied in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 
U.S. 436 (1966). We further agree that a reading 
of a so-called 11Miranda card 11 was given by police 
Officer Sneddon. We contend, however, that the 
employees of the lntermountain Indian School who 
were present with the boys during the interrogatioo 
by the Brigham City pol ice officer were not there 
to protect the rights of these defendants, but were 
there to assist 0 ff i cer Sneddon and were a pa rt of 
the investigatory team. It is not contended at any 
place, either in the transcript or in the brief oi 
appellant, that the defendants were informed that 
they need not be interrogated. In most instances 
they were brought from their beds late at night, 
or early in the morning, and were not given a 
choice whether or not they would be summoned. They 
were awakened by Indian School personnel and taken 
to an office for questioning by Officer Sneddon 
(T.196). 
It is the contention of the appellant that 
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a meaningful and knowledgeable waiver of the 
rights of the defendants under the Miranda rule 
was had. However, the transcript is replete with 
numerous instances wherein no attempt was made to 
indicate to these students the penalty for rape. 
(T.197, T.215, T.223). 
In connection with the right to counsel, it 
was never explained in an adequate manner how 
these Indian boys, most of whom were hundreds of 
miles from home, would be able to secure services 
of an attorney. The mere bald statement that 
counsel would be provided, we submit, is unsuffi-
cient. An illustration of this problem can be 
found (T.352) wherein the fol lowing testimony was 
given by Ron Edwards, an employee of the school: 
And yet you didn 1 t apprise him of 
any consequence that might occur as 
a result of making this statement? 
I did not tell him anything about it. 
All I asked him was to tell the truth. 
That was my advice to him. 
And that's all the advice you gave him? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. Yet you were his guidance counselor? 
"A. Right. 
"Q. Did you know of what constitutional 
rights he had at the time? 
"A. Yes, I know he could have contacted a 
1 awyer. 
"Q. How could he have contacted one? 
''A. I don't know, but I know he has a 
right to. 
6 
"Q. How could he have contacted one? Did 
you tell him that he could get up and 
walk out of that room and contact a 
lawyer? 
''A. No. 11 
At the beginning of the trial a hearing was 
made upon defense counse 1 1 s motion to suppress 
statements of the defendants (T. 160). The Court, 
after listening to the motion and testimony in 
re I at ion ship thereto, met in chambers with counsel 
and announced thereafter that the trial would coo-
mence (T.229). After the trial was concluded and 
the verdicts rendered, the Court, having not here-
tofore forma 11 y made an announcement in the record 
concerning the motion to suppress, made the 
ing statement: 
"In this Court's view now -- and I confess 
that if I had it to do over again I 
wouldn't have even sent for the jury in 
this Court's view, the statements obtained 
by the officer were so tainted and so 
muddied up that they can't or couldn't be 
said to be free and voluntary. 
"Now I realize that what I am saying now is 
different from what I instructed this jury 
this morning. If this were nine o'clock 
A.M., feeling as I do now, I would have 
had to have told this jury that these 
written confessions which were received in 
evidence could not be deened voluntary. 
because two prior oral statements previous 
no warnings had been given." (T.516) 
The Court, in further explanation of his order 
granting the motion for Arrest of Judgment (T.511 
stated as fol lows: 
"The defendants have no money, Tribal 
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t:ouncil gave these boys no assistance, the 
Department of the Interior gave these boys 
no assistance, they're paupers here before 
the court, and the court does not propose 
to 'throw the book' at these boys and force 
the defendants to appea 1 in order to 
clarify this question. 11 
"But as of right now, as long as this indi-
vidual is sitting in this court in this 
District, no officer, no guidance authority 
must ever take any confess ions from anyone 
without giving them the Miranda warning. 
As long as I sit here, I will not receive 
any confessions by any school officer, any 
peace officer if such be based on a secret, 
private confession theretofore obtained, 
without giving the Miranda warning.n (T.517) 
ARGUMENT 
PO I NT 
THE STATE IS LEGALLY ENTITLED TO PROSECUTE AN 
APPEAL IN THIS CASE. 
The respondents concede that the State may 
the judgment in this case. 
PO I NT 11 
THE RESPONDENTS WERE ENTITLED TO THE MIRANDA 
WARNING WHEN BEING QUESTIONED CONCERNING THE 
ALLEGED CRIME BY THE INTERMOUNTAIN INDIAN SCHOOL 
PERSONNEL, PRIOR TO THEIR BEING QUESTIONED BY 
OFFICER SNEDDON. 
(A) THE RESPONDENTS WERE IN A STATUS OF 11CUSTOD IAL 
I NTERROGATI ON 11 BY THEIR GU I DANCE COUNSELOR. 
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(B) THE GUIDANCE COUNSELORS WERE NOT LAW ENFORCE-
MENT OFFICERS, BUT WERE IN THE STATUS OF 
AIDING THE OFFICER IN HIS INVESTIGATION. 
We agree with the appellant that the rule 
governing this issue is as stated in the brief of 
the appellant: 
11 
••• The prosecution may not use state-
ments, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, 
stemming from custodial interrogation of 
the defendant •.. By custodial interroga-
tion, we mean questioning initiated by law 
enforcement officers after a person has---
been taken into custody or otherwise 
deprived of his freedom of action in any 
significant way. 11 (Emphasis added.) 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) 
(A) THE RESPONDENTS WERE DEPRIVED OF THEIR FREEDOM 
OF ACTION IN A SIGNIFICANT WAY UNDER THE TERMS 
OF THE MIRANDA CASE. 
The brief of the appellant while quoting the 
rule in the Miranda case, as set forth above, 
correctly, speaks only of the question of 11custody 11 • 
It does not discuss the 11or 11 aspect of the rule. 
The real issue under this argument concerns itself 
with the question of whether or not these students 1 
freedom of action had been impaired in any signifi-
cant way. In approaching this argument it is 
necessary to point out the fact that these 
were several hundred miles from home. Were 1 iving 
in a "boarding school" environment. The school, in 
addition to providing these students with educa-
tional opportunities, further provided them with 
counselors of various types. This guidance service 
is provided on a twenty-four-hour basis for these 
students (T. 176). These guidance people provided 
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the students with personal assistance as wel I as 
assistance in connection with their formal educa-
tion. The school, however, as indicated in the 
statement of facts I isted heretofore, determined 
to take an active part in the investigation of 
these alleged crimes. This involved investigation 
v:ork by school personnel, interrogation of 
individual students, taking of tape-recorded 
statements of students, and advice to students as 
ro the manner in which they shou Id conduct them-
selves while being interrogated by pol ice Officer 
Sneddon. Under these circumstances, it is the 
contention of the respondents that the Court 
correctly viewed the total situation in ruling 
that the students were given no assistance by 
either the government, the school, or their tribe, 
in hand I ing a situation which could result in 
their imprisonment for life (T.517). In question-
ing these students at all hours of the day and 
night, including as late as 2:45 A.M. (T.444) in 
taking them from their beds to answer questions, 
in one instance for three successive nights 
(T.325), and in no instance indicating to the 
students that they did not have to go to be inter-
rogated by pol ice Office Sneddon (T.196), the 
school was acting as part of the pol ice process. 
Under the factual situation as reflected in 
the transcript, it is clear the students were 
deprived of their freedom of action in a signifi-
cant way. It is further clear that the reason for 
the deprivation of their freedom of action was to 
assist the pol ice officer in his gathering of 
evidence against these defendants. 
In regard to the question of whether or not 
the investigation had 11 focused on the accused," 
as required in the case of Escobedo v. I 11 i no is, 
e 378 U.S. 478 (1964), a brief resume of the manner 
in which the school and the Pol ice Department 
cooperated during this investigation will clearly 
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indicate that these students who were questioned, 
both by Mr. Sneddon and by the individual Indian 
School personnel, were in the category of those 
defendants upon whom the investigatory 1 ight was 
in fact focused. 
The heretofore quoted statement of Mr. Stan-
1 ay Speaks, a Senior Supervisor at the Indian School 
(T. 195) wherein he indicated to the Tri ba 1 Leaders 
that 11we were involving Mr. Sneddon, 11 indicates the 
active part the School was playing in the investi-
gation. A Guidance Counselor informed Mose Clark 
(T.314), after an initial discussion with him, to 
return and discuss the matter with him again. De· 
fendant Reid Barber (T.319) was questioned by a 
Mr. Palmer, a school official, and the fol lowing 
testimony was elicited: 
11A. talked to Reid twice down at the 
Guidance Center, both times his name 
had come up again and again as being 
involved in some way in this, and so 
we asked him to come down. These two 
times that I talked with Reid, I just 
talked to him casually and asked him 
if he knew anything about what had 
happened down there that he wanted to 
tell me. Both times he said he didn't 
and he went back to the dormitory. 11 
It can hardly be contended by the appellant 
that this type of interrogation, without benefit of) 
any warning whatsoever, was not of a suspect on 
whom the investigation had focused. Later, after 
two appearances before the Student Gui dance Person-
ne l, Mr. Barber was taken before the pol ice officer I 
and a statement secured. 
The brief of the appe 11 ant speaks of the fact 
that Officer Sneddon questioned students whose 
names had been supplied him, in the area of 
11general questioning. 11 In every instance the stu· 
dents questioned by Mr. Sneddon were those who 
l l 
the Indian School personnel had previously deter-
, jned were suspects upon which 11 the investigation 
should be focused. 11 
The brief of appellant further speaks 
of 11 requests 11 by which the students were brought 
before Officer Sneddon. In no instance does the 
transcript reflect that any student was 11 requested 11 
to go before Officer Sneddon. In each instance 
the student was approached by Indian School person-
nel and told to come to the area, to the off ice of 
Mr. Sneddon for questioning. It is true that the 
respondents went to Officer Sneddon in the company 
of their counse I or. However, as has been i 11 us-
trated throughout the transcript, the counselors 
gave them no advice other than to tell the truth, 
and had themse Ives, in most instances, been active 
in the investigation and interrogation of the 
students whose welfare they were alleged to be 
protecting. The brief of the appellant indicates 
that their presence at the interrogation by 
Officer Sneddon could not be considered as 
11constructive custody. 11 It must be left to con-
jecture whether the students would have gotten 
out of bed and accompanied their Guidance Coun-
selors to these late hour interrogation sessions 
if given a choice. The evidence is silent that 
any of them were told they need not accompany 
their counselor to these question sessions. Under 
these circumstances, in view of the pecu 1 i ar hand i -
caps under which these students were found, the 
facts negate any serious contention that a voluntary 
refusal on their part to accompany their counselors 
was tenable. The clear imp I ication was that they 
v1ere being ordered by schoo I personne I, to whom 
they owed a duty to obey, to accompany said person-
nel for questioning. It is clearly a "deprivation" 
of their freedom of action in a significant way 
under the Miranda ru I e. 
The next contention of the appel !ant, that the 
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purpose of the Guidance Counselors being present 
was to represent the best interests of the studenti 
is negated by the testimony of the counse I ors that 
they were active in the investigation. As has beer 
pointed out (T.375) the Guidance Counselors consid· 
ered their position to be of a dual nature. This 
is indicated by the statement that they were on 
11 both sides." The brief of appe 11 ant speaks 
finally of the case of United States v. Manglona, 
414 F.2d 642 (9th Cir. 1969). In the Manglona we 
have a situation where an adult volunteered to be 
questioned. The case further indicates that the 
defendant, Manglona, was specifically told that he 
was not under arrest and was free to terminate the 
interview at any time. We believe the court 
correctly ruled in the Manglona case that he was 
not in custody. In no instance in the present 
case, however, is there any indication that these 
students were told, either directly or indirectly, 
either by word or deed, that they were free to 
terminate the interview at any time; either the 
interview with Officer Sneddon or the interviews 
with their Guidance Counselors, wherein the 
incriminating evidence was first secured. 
In conclusion, it is the contention of the 
respondents that there was in fact cus tod i a 1 inter· 
rogation in this case. In the event, however, it 
is determined there was not custodial interrogation 
there surely was a situation in which they were 
deprived of "their freedom of action in a signifi· 
cant way." I call attention to the specific manner 
in which the Court states, in the Miranda case, 
that the deprivation is in "any" significant way. 
The contention that the students were sti I I on 
their campus, that they were not taken away from 
their usual area of living, is not a correct view. 
They were taken, frequently late at night, to an 
office building and there required to wait for . I 
various periods of time until taken before a police: 
officer. It is hard to conceive of a situation 
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more conducive to frightening and removing the 
nature of an Indian student's state-
,,1ents, than to subject him to being removed from 
his bed and questioned under the circumstances 
of this case. 
Therefore, we contend there was custodial 
interrogation. There was significant deprivation 
of their freedom of action. 
(8) THE GUIDANCE COUNSELORS, WHILE NOT LAW ENFORCE-
MENT OFFICERS, WERE ACTING IN AN INVESTIGATORY 
CAPAC I TY. 
We concede that the school Guidance Counselors 
are not pol ice officers. We cannot concede, as 
alleged by the appellant, that their function was 
to assist the student with his problems and counsel 
him in matters leading to an education and a useful 
life (P.11). While they may be in this capacity in 
the usual course of their duties at the school, in 
this instance they were recruited to assist a 
• police officer in an investigation of a crime. The 
quotations heretofore I isted in this brief show the 
school took an active part in the investigation. 
The school held meetings and collected names and 
statements. They interrogated individual students, 
took statements, tape-recorded statements, and 
actively advised the students concerning how they 
should conduct themselves while before the Brigham 
City pol ice officer. 
In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) 
the court indicated that if the questioning was 
"initiated 11 by law enforcement officers after a 
person has been taken into custody or otherwise 
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant 
way, the prohibition would apply to the agents of 
the officers as we I I as the officers themse Ives. 
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In a 11 of the cases cited by the appe 1 l ant o; 
this point, People v. Ronald W. (Anonymous), 24 N. 
Y.2d 732, 249 N.E.2d 882 (1969), and as in Clark 
v. State, 222 S.2d 766 (Fla. 1969), the 
that probation officers are simi Jar to these 
Counselors is fallacious. The primary 
difference between the two situations is that in 
the case of the probation officer, questions were 
directed to their probationers concerning needle 
marks and other evidence that might reflect on a , 
probation violation. The probationers made 
sions or confessions to their probation officers 
which indicated they were implicated in crimes. 
In these instances the questioning was ruled 
a normal part of a probation officer's services to 
his probationer. However, in the instant case we 
have a situation where the school actively 
initiated an investigation as to this specific 
alleged act, the alleged rapes, and were actively 
seeking information and suspects. When suspects 
were located they were questioned by school 
personnel, and if the answers indicated impl ica-
tion, were taken before Officer Sneddon. 
It is significant that on a number of instance' 
the transcript reflects that the students were 
questioned a number of times, indicating the invest 
gation had been focused upon them. This occurred 
when a student's name was mentioned more than once 
others who were being questioned (T. 185). The 
respondents do not believe it can seriously be 
contended that the school personnel, from the 
beginning of this occurrence until the statements 
were taken by pol ice Officer Sneddon, were anything 
other than investigators assisting the pol ice 
officer, and that under the terms of the Miranda 
case their work was in fact "initiated'' by a law 
enforcement officer. Therefore, their acts are 
the acts of the pol ice officer and come within the 





O; PO I NT 11 I 
N. 
THE RESPONDENTS WERE NOT PROPERLY ADVISED OF 
or THEIR MIRANDA RIGHTS BY OFFICER SNEDDON. ANY 
WAIVER THEREOF WAS NOT MADE VOLUNTARILY, KNOWINGLY, 
AND INTELLIGENTLY. 
We concede that the record indicates a Miranda 
1· wMning was given by Officer Sneddon in each 
instance. We do not concede that there was an 
understanding of the defendants' rights under the 
Miranda rule prior to their givinq statements to 
Officer Sneddon. It is the contention of appel-
lant that these statements were not given after 
long periods of interrogation. This we concede, 
as well. In fact, the testimony indicates the 
longest interrogation by Officer Sneddon was 
thirty-five minutes, and the shortest interroga-
tion was five minutes (T.190). The fact that 
these students were taken, without being asked if 
they wished to go. to be interrogated by Officer 
Sneddon at late and unusual hours, as has been 
ice! cited repeatedly in this brief, is anothP.r 
that would tend to indicate that these statements 
st were not voluntary. The testi1Pony in the case 
indicates little, if anything, was said concerning 
e the nature of the charges that might be brought or 
the penalty therefor (T.197, T.215, T.223). 
The evidence is summarized by the Court 
IT.570). wherein he indicated that they had 
ng received no assistance from the United States 
Govern111ent, the Tribal Council, or the Indian 
School itself. In addition to the age and 
lang1Jage barriers that existed, the fact that 
these students were far from home and those who 
could assist them is i1nportant. It is the con-
e. tent ion of the respondents that these various 
factors, separately as well as together, clearly 
J 6 
indicate that these students were not in a posi-
tion to intelligently and knowingly waive a 
valuable right, in view of the nature of the 
charge and the penalty attached thereto. 
POINT IV 
THE DOCTRINE OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY IS AN ISSUE 
IN THIS MATTER. 
A motion was made by respondents to arrest 
judgment, after a return of guilty by the jury. 
The Court had, heretofore, heard evidence in con-
nection with the motion to suppress the statements 
of the respondents. The Court did not, at the 
conclusion of this hearing, formally state a 
decision. The Court did order the trial to commenc, 
however. The issue appears to be whether or not 
the Court, after al lowing the case to go to the 
jury and after having received the verdict of 
guilty on the charges, can then grant a motion in 
Arrest of Judgment, and bar the State from enforce· 
ment of the jury's verdict under the theory of 
double jeopardy. 
The case of State v. Iverson, JO Utah 2d 171, 
350 P. 2d 152 ( 1960), was a case in which the verdic 
had not been forma 11 y entered. One of the jurors 
had changed his mind and before entry of the verdic 
had indicated a refusal to concur in a verdict of 
guilty. Also, in this case, the Court had reservec 
ruling on a motion to dismiss. Thereafter, after 
the fa i I u re of the jury to agree, the Court grantee 
the motion to dismiss. 
State v. Sandman, 4 Utah 2d 69, 286 P.2d 1060 
(1955), was a case wherein the Court, in indicatin, 
that there could be no further proceedings in the 





03. 157 P.2d 258, as to when jeopardy cittaches. 
1 
n the Thatcher case, after a charge of i nvo I un-
tary 111anslaughter had been brought, and the State 1 s 
case had been concluded, the defendant moved for 
dismissal and this was granted. The defendant was 
discharged and the State appea I ed. It is the 
contention of the respondents that the Court's 
granting of the respondents' motion in the instant 
case was tantamount to the granting of a motion to 
dismiss. We contend that, notwithstanding the 
Court 1 s failure to expressly reserve decision on 
the initial motion to suppress, it still did in 
fact grant the original motion. This intention is 
reflected in the statement by the Court (T.516): 
11 1 f this was nine o'clock a.m., feeling 
as I do now, I would have had to have 
told this jury that these written con-
fessions which were received in evidence 
could not be deemed voluntary, because 
two prior oral statements previous no 
warnings had been given. 11 
An overall reading of the transcript clearly 
indicates the Court did in fact grant a motion to 
dismiss on the grounds that the evidence was 
insufficient to justify the verdict of the jury. 
To require the motion to be labled in a certain 
form. or to require the Court to have made a 
formal reservation of action, would be to defeat 
the ends of justice. 
Therefore, the contention of the State that 
double jeopardy would not attach in this instance 
is without merit. The defendants were tried, 
jeopardy attached, and the Court ruled that there 
was insufficient evidence to justify a jury in 
returning the verdicts of guilty. The Court, 
therefore, granted the motion of the respondents 
and directed the dismissal of the action. Both 
the State of Utah and the respondents have had 
18 
their day in court, and the judgment of dismissal 
should stand. 
CONCLUSION 
It is the respondents' contention that the 
defendants were entitled to the Miranda warnings 
prior to being interrogated by their Guidance 
Supervisors. It is contended that the focus of 
investigation was upon these defendants at the 
time the Guidance Counselors questioned them. It 
is further the contention of the respondents that 
at the time of their questioning they were doing 
the work of the pol ice officers, that the questioo 
ing was initiated by the pol ice officers and the 
school supervisory personnel; that the evidence 
reflects a custodial type questioning by the super 
visors as wel I as by the pol ice officer; that the 
students were deprived in a significant manner of 
their freedom under the evidence of this case, ana 
were not free to go or not go to sessions of ques· 
tioning either with Guidance Counselors or the 
pol ice officer. The manner in which the police 
interrogation proceeded, preceded by the 
gation of the Indian School staff, the late night 
questioning, the failure to adequately advise of 
penalties, and the failure to effectively communi· 
cate with the students their rights to counsel, 
would place any statement given by them in the 
category of an involuntary statement under the 
prohibitions of the Miranda case. Therefore, 
appeal of the State should be dismissed and the 
respondents permanently discharged. 
Respectfully submitted, 
L. G. Bl NGHAM 
Attorney for respondent 
203 24th Street 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
